

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

Interview with Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, Commanding General, V Corps. Conducted at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany, 14 November 2002 and 6 February 2003. Interviewer: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

The subject of this interview was the possible forthcoming military operations in southwest Asia to achieve the national policy objectives of disarming Iraq and bringing about a change in the regime, specifically removing Saddam Hussein from power. The first interview took place immediately after V Corps began pre-positioning its tactical command post and some combat forces in Kuwait. V Corps staff principals had begun a series of trips to Kuwait to develop situational awareness, and Gen. Wallace was to travel to Kuwait in the course of the following week. The interview therefore focused on Gen. Wallace's concept of the operation prior to deployment of forces and before all operations plans were in their final form.

The second interview took place following a series of preparatory exercises conducted by USCENTCOM and V Corps; after the UN Weapons Inspectors' report to the UN Security Council that heightened the possibility of military action; and after major changes had been made in the basic war plan.

Q. Sir, when I did an end of tour interview with Gen. Hendrix,¹ he remarked that some of the people at Department of the Army wanted to turn V Corps into the "Balkan Corps," but that we were also the "Southwest Asian Corps," among other things, and had to maintain readiness for that. When you took command and reviewed our lay down of missions, what was your evaluation of which were the more important, and how did that affect your setting of training priorities for the Corps? What did you perceive the urgency of the southwest Asia mission to be?

A. When I got here, the urgency never struck me. But what did strike me was the fact that the complexion in USAREUR had changed dramatically since my last time over here. The situation was this: we live in Europe but we are probably going to fight

¹ (U) Lt. Gen. John W. ("Jay") Hendrix, commanded V Corps from 31 July 1997 to 16 November 1999 and led the V Corps task force in Operation VICTORY HAWK, the European Command mission to Albania during the Kosovo Air Campaign, 8 April through 2 August 1999. Promoted to general, he subsequently commanded United States Forces Command and retired from the Army in the fall of 2002. See Interview, (b)(6) with Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix, Commanding General, V Corps, conducted at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany, 2 November 1999.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

elsewhere. So we must be strategically deployable and think about deployability as one of the major tenets of our training programs, because in the absence of that, we aren't going to be of much use to anybody. We would suffer the possibility of being irrelevant. Having a heavy Corps in Europe is of no use to anybody if we can't get out of Europe with it. Now, I wouldn't have told you that when I was first in Europe in 1983. But the fact of the matter is that deployability is number one, now.

Being in Europe is equally important to being able to get out of Europe.² Being in Europe creates a connection with our NATO allies and potential allies for other operations. The personal relationships that you create through that connection cannot be created, in my judgment, by making a cameo appearance for training periodically in the area of responsibility. It just doesn't work that way. You develop those relationships over time, and sometimes they aren't personal relationships, but cultural relationships. Our relationships with the German military are just as strong now as they have ever been, even with the understanding that the German military is less professional today than it was ten years ago.

Frankly, my assumption upon my arrival here was that the primary mission of V Corps was in the Balkans. And in fact, it was, at the time. But you had to balance, in my judgment, deployability training with high intensity conflict training and with training for security and cooperation in the Balkans. That's kind of what I figured the job was going to be for a while. And then the eleventh of September happened.³

Q. When did your evaluation of which mission had priority begin to shift?

A. My original take, on 11 September, was that we were at war, but our role in the war was primarily defensive. Our responsibility was to defend our facilities and our people and our way of life and our freedoms as they existed over here in Europe . . . until we

² (U) Emphasis in original.

³ (U) That is, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers in New York City on 9 September 2001.

2
~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

kind of figured things out. It was pretty clear to all of us, I think, that force protection was a major mission. We weren't quite clear, though, about how to get at this guy and his network. Then, looking at the history of the thing, operations in Afghanistan proceeded well. The special operations troops did a miraculous job in a very short period of time. And even then, I saw our role as still being primarily defensive. It occurred to me that the better we were able to defend, the better we would be able to execute offensive operations, be they conventional operations or special operations or unconventional operations—whatever the hell those operations were going to be. But as long as the nation was not distracted by another World Trade Tower, then that would give us the latitude and the freedom to execute offensive operations on our terms against whatever enemy we were able to uncover thereafter.

That only lasted for two months. Then, sometime about mid-November of 2001, ^{we} were informed that we would be the Army's main planning headquarters, at that time, for operations against Iraq. I can't remember the exact date—you'll have to look at the message traffic—and at this point, I can't remember from whence came that direction, but we got it. At that point, I believe the thinking was—and you'd probably have to go outside this headquarters to find any documentation on this—that if something were to happen on the Korean peninsula, then III Corps was dedicated to that. The XVIII Airborne Corps was focused primarily on the Afghanistan problem. The I Corps, because of its composition, wasn't really in the fight, other than keeping a focus on the near-term Pacific and Army transformation. That sort of left V Corps.

The missions that we were originally given . . . we are on about the fifth iteration of that plan, now. The first plan was a V Corps-only operation, with the assumption that we would receive some Marine Corps augmentation—relatively minor, maybe a MEU⁴ or a piece of a regiment. The mission was to attack to seize terrain in southern Iraq in preparation for future offensive operations, or something of that ilk. We spent a couple

⁴ (U) Marine Expeditionary Unit, a battalion-sized force.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

of months developing a plan, briefing the plan, and getting it approved by the CFLCC⁵ commander. We were about 75 percent done with that when the question was asked "well, what can you do quicker, with forces in place?"

So we developed another plan, which was a limited objective attack. The first plan was primarily force-oriented, focused on the III Iraqi Corps and IV Iraqi Corps. The second plan was a very limited objective attack, focused on the southern oil fields, but not going beyond the Euphrates River. And so we developed that plan and presented it to the CFLCC.

The next evolution of the plan—and I don't know whether this was news to us or just kind of indicative of how the thinking was evolving in Central Command⁶ and in the National Command Authority—but the next issue became what happened if we had to go all the way to Baghdad. We started working on this third iteration of the plan, and it has come to be known as the Generated Start Force Plan. For the first time, this plan introduced the I Marine Expeditionary Force as a companion force to V Corps. It was two parallel three-star headquarters with associated forces. Throughout all of this, V Corps has been designated as the main effort.

The fourth iteration of the plan, which has become known as the Hybrid Plan,⁷ is an evolution of a sensing at echelons above me that, if Saddam Hussein miscalculated somehow, or if some incident caused a decision to be made that we should retaliate in some form—say they shot down an airplane and captured the pilot, or perhaps they attacked the Kurds—then we needed to have an immediate response. The immediate response almost inevitably has to be Air Force, because that's what is already sitting over

⁵ (U) Combined Forces Land Component Commander.

⁶ (U) United States Central Command, with headquarters at McDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, retains responsibility for U.S. operations in the Middle East and commanded United States forces during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War.

⁷ (~~S/ORCON~~) USCINCCENT OPLAN 1003V(S), 15 October 2002; and the supporting V Corps Operations Plan Cobra II, 290600Z October 2002.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

there in NORTHERN WATCH⁸ and SOUTHERN WATCH,⁹ and they already have an established pattern of operations. There was also a recognition, and I believe a recollection, that when Saddam Hussein kicked the inspectors out of Iraq the last time in 1998 and we executed Operation DESERT FOX, that had no influence on events at all, other than blowing up a lot of stuff.¹⁰ The recognition was that, if you really want to affect the region and effect a change in the regime, it had to be done with ground forces.

Yet, there was a lingering concern that if some event were precipitated by some action of Saddam Hussein, or a miscalculation of his, or because we finally lost patience with Iraq, there needed to be some plan for what our action would be. This Hybrid Plan was developed on some Air Force work by the CFACC,¹¹ and involved a very short-duration

⁸ (U) Operation NORTHERN WATCH was a Combined Task Force charged with enforcing the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq and monitoring Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions 678, 687, and 688. The northern no-fly zone was not an aggression against Iraq or a violation of its sovereignty, but a necessary and legitimate measure to limit Iraq's aggressive air activities. Operation NORTHERN WATCH was the successor to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which officially ended in December, 1996. Operation NORTHERN WATCH began January 1, 1997, with an initial mandate of six months. The Turkish parliament reviewed and renewed the ONW mandate semi-annually in June and December. The ONW coalition partners—the United States, United Kingdom, and Turkey—provided approximately 45 aircraft and more than 1,400 personnel to support Operation Northern Watch. The joint U.S. force included soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines from the Navy, Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, all operating as part of the United States European Command. ONW was headquartered at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

⁹ (U) Operation SOUTHERN WATCH began in August of 1992 and enforced the air exclusion zone ("no fly" zone) that barred all Iraqi aircraft south of the 32nd parallel and protected some seven million Shiite marsh Arabs in the region. As the mission developed, it expanded to include Patriot missile task forces from United States Forces Command and U.S. Army, Europe, on half-year rotations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

¹⁰ (U) United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors announced that Iraq had refused to hand over key weapons-program documents and was impeding inspections. UNSCOM inspectors withdrew from the country on 15 December 1998 and did not return. Operation DESERT FOX began on December 16, 1998, when United States Central Command military forces launched cruise missile attacks against military targets in Iraq. The strikes were designed to deliver a serious blow to Saddam Hussein's capability to manufacture, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten or otherwise intimidate his neighbors. The U.S.S. *Enterprise* (CVN 65) aircraft carrier battle group, on a Mediterranean/Arabian Gulf deployment, supported DESERT FOX while conducting operations in the Arabian Gulf under operational control of the Central Command. Operation SHINING PRESENCE, a V Corps deployment of a Patriot missile task force of 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, 69th ADA Brigade, and under command of the V Corps deputy commanding general, Maj. Gen. Julian B. Burns, augmented Israeli air defenses between 10 December and just before Christmas, 1998.

¹¹ (U) Combined Forces Air Component Command.

5
~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

preparatory air campaign—short in comparison to the campaign waged during Operation DESERT STORM—followed immediately by a ground campaign waged by whatever forces we were able to have in place early. The notion was that we would be fighting and flowing in forces at the same time, unlike what happened during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, when we assembled our forces, trained them, and then crossed the line of departure on our terms and on our schedule, after the air campaign had softened up the Iraqi armed forces.

This Hybrid Plan has the component of simultaneous preparatory operations on the part of the Air Force in terms of strategic and operational targets while the ground campaign begins. The ground campaign goes as far as we can go with forces that are in place, as we flow additional forces into theater to press the issue toward Baghdad. Hence the hybrid nature of the plan—it's an early option. But the end state is the same as with the Generated Start Force Plan—you end up around Baghdad. The Hybrid Plan was also the first time that the I Marine Expeditionary Force became a main player. In fact, the area of operations of the I MEF is almost identical to the first operation that V Corps put together, a limited operation to take care of the Iraqi III and IV Corps. In fact, as soon as the MEF was given that mission and we were given the main effort to sweep to the west to Baghdad, I sent our planners, our order of battle technicians, our terrain technicians, and all of our plans to Camp Pendleton and laid out our plan for them. We told them they could accept it or reject it, but we gave them all the work we had done in terms of terrain analysis and course of action development and all of that sort of stuff. Now, I'm sure they won't give us credit for it, but our planners did a lot of work and it probably jump-started the Marine Corps' development of their part of the plan.

What you end up with is a plan that is acknowledged to be ugly, early, if we have to go early. It is a plan that has the Air Force initiating hostilities and whatever ground forces we have available initiating ground action, and that ground force may be purely a brigade or two of the 3rd Infantry Division, depending on what the incident is that starts the action.

6
~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

Q. I presume that the equipment that 3rd Armored Division and 1st Armored Division left behind in Kuwait at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 is crucial to this plan. I believe it amounted to roughly two brigade sets of equipment.¹²

A. That's right. There is a brigade on the ground there now and there is a second brigade's worth of equipment available. Of course, we have an attack helicopter battalion there now,¹³ too, and there are other things going on in the theater to establish a base of operations even in the absence of having the deployment orders. The movement of forces and the development of infrastructure has been pushed, too, but has not crossed over the boundary of ambiguity and inambiguity yet. I think we have done that on purpose. We have shown a sense of purpose, to the point that the United Nations Security Council Resolution was signed¹⁴ and Saddam Hussein has accepted the fact that weapons inspections will come in.¹⁵ Now, whether or not he allows that to happen is

¹² (U) The equipment available in the Kuwait Theater of Operations in May 1991 that was used by 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and TF 14a Armor in Operation POSITIVE FORCE in 1991 and that remained in theater for use by brigades undergoing training rotations based in Camp Doha, Kuwait, amounted to the following:

<u>1st Armored Division</u>	<u>3rd Armored Division</u>
2 Armor Battalions	3 Armor Battalions
2 Infantry Battalions (Less BFVs)	2 Infantry Battalions
2 Field Artillery Battalions	1 Field Artillery Battalion
1 Signal Battalion (non-MSE)	1 Main Support Battalion
1 Main Support Battalion	2 Forward Support Battalions
1 Forward Support Battalion	1 MI Battalion
1 MI Battalion	1 MP Company
1 ADA Battalion	1 Chemical Company

See (b)(6) "Ruck it up!" *The Post-Cold War Transformation of V Corps, 1990-2001* (Hq., V Corps, History Office draft MS), chapter 5.

¹³ (U) The 2nd Squadron, 6th Cavalry, of the 11th Aviation Group, V Corps.

¹⁴ (U) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002, declared Iraq to be in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions as early as UNSCR 687 of 1991 through its failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the International Atomic Energy Agency and required to it submit an accurate declaration of its chemical, biological, and nuclear programs and weapons not later than 8 December 2002 and to admit weapons inspectors to free, complete, and unhindered access to all sites in Iraq.

¹⁵ (U) After the Parliament of Iraq unanimously rejected UNSCR 1441 on 12 November 2001, Saddam Hussein and the Revolutionary Command Council on 14 November acceded to it, announcing that decision in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

7
~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

anybody's guess. All of us who have watched the newspapers over the last ten years don't believe for a minute that he is going to live up to his agreements, but we'll see. What you end up with now, with the Hybrid Plan, is that the Air Force starts the fight and the ground forces start to move, with the MEF becoming the initial main effort. They are thought to be able to get there quicker with their command and control facilities. How the decision was made to make the MEF the initial main effort is lost on me. I don't know where that decision was made or who made it. It just kind of happened without any input from us—us, the Corps, or us, the Army, as best I can determine. I don't know whether there was some external pressure or whether it was made by Gen. Mikolashek,¹⁶ the CFLCC commander, or what. But anyway, all of a sudden the MEF was the initial main effort and, in fact, the 3rd Infantry Division is going to work for the MEF, initially, until such time as we get enough stuff in to assume the main effort ourselves.

Important to note, though, that both the Hybrid Plan and the Generated Start Force Plan end up at pretty much the same end state with the same number of forces being employed. There have been two spins on that story that have happened within the last sixty days that I think are interesting. One is the acknowledgement and recognition that we probably need to have something going on in the north at the same time that we have something going on in the south. My sensing has been that, originally, the thought was that Special Operations forces stirring up the Kurds would be sufficient to fix Iraqi forces in the north along what is known as the Green Line, kind of the boundary between Kurdistan and the unofficial Iraqi border. I think that, eventually, the CENTCOM planners came to the understanding that Special Operations forces probably weren't enough, and that we needed significant ground forces up there to execute an operation from north to south at the same time as we were attacking from south to north.

The question was how the hell you do that. What is evolving now . . . and it ain't a done deal yet . . . is that the 4th Infantry Division from the United States will be that ground

¹⁶ (U) Lt. Gen. Paul Mikolashek, commanding general, Third U.S. Army, 29 June 2000 until 4 September 2002, deployed the army headquarters to Kuwait.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

force. They will be supported by the U.S. Army, Europe, support structure and theater support command, and the ARFOR¹⁷ that will operate out of Turkey will be the 1st Infantry Division headquarters. We have this ARFOR that has the rear area responsibility and the logistics support responsibility for the division that will cross the Turkish-Iraqi border from north to south. By its presence and by its operations, that force will probably fix those Iraqi forces along the Green Line. Now, I say that it isn't a done deal yet because the Turks have not yet agreed. The recent Turkish elections had to be complete before any deals were struck.¹⁸ Though there have been discussions with the Turkish General Staff, there have been no agreements made yet, and it is still to be determined how much the Turks want to participate in all this, both in terms of rear area security and whether they will want to contribute combat forces. There is of course the Turkish-Kurdish issue to be dealt with and that complicates matters.

Now we have USAREUR dealing with V Corps moving to the south, supporting 4th Infantry Division with the ARFOR, rear area security mission to the north and, simultaneous with all of that, providing logistical support to all the remaining Central Region forces. And, the third thing going on is the deployment of Patriot missiles to Israel, which is a necessary component to all of this to do the same thing that we did successfully during DESERT STORM in keeping the Israelis out of the fight and forestalling all the international political problems that would come along with that if it happened. That also is a V Corps mission, with the 69th ADA Brigade as the core of a joint task force in Israel to provide Patriot protection for the Israelis.

The second spin within the last sixty days is that the CFLCC commander gave V Corps primary planning responsibility for urban operations in and around Baghdad. Thus the ideas of an outer cordon, an inner cordon, forward combat bases and projecting combat

¹⁷ (U) Army Force, *i.e.*, the single-service command component.

¹⁸ (U) The Turkish elections on 3 November 2002 returned a parliamentary majority for the Justice and Development Party, which was organized in 2001-2002 by moderate members of the pro-Islamic Virtue Party, a group officially outlawed. The AK (Justice and Development Party) considers itself a modern, conservative, secular political party.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

power into the city is for a purpose, because we have that mission ourselves. The CFLCC commander wants one commander who is responsible for AO Baghdad. Now, I don't begin to assume that there will be one actual commander in AO Baghdad. I think there will be a couple of three-stars and a couple of four-stars and a couple of high powered civilians trying to exercise authority there.

When you work through all this stuff, you find that the Corps is involved in about six simultaneous operations: the south to north attack main effort; support of the northern axis option of the attack; the Patriots to Israel; the continuing Balkans rotations; the Central Region force protection mission under all conditions; and the fifth mission is the one we don't know about yet—and I don't know what it is, but it's out there somewhere. Just pushing all of our forces out of Central Region is a mission in and of itself.

Q. I was going to raise that question. During Operation DESERT SHIELD, V Corps was here to push VII Corps out of Germany, and our judgment at the time was that it probably took a Corps to get another Corps deployed. Who is going to push V Corps?

A. The BSB/ASG structure,¹⁹ the residual from the 1st Infantry Division that is not in the Balkans, and anybody else who is left here will do it. Gen. Meigs²⁰ has said that if you aren't guarding gates, you're going to be pushing. When you shred through all the numbers, there are about 7,000 soldiers in the Corps that are not committed to one or another of those missions. I've got to hope . . . and I know hope is not a method—I've read the book²¹ . . . that all of these operations, though they will be near-simultaneously,

¹⁹ (U) Base Support Battalion and Area Support Group. After the deployment of 1st Armored Division as Task Force 1.4a for Operation joint endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1995 and January 1996, V Corps concluded that the BSB required considerable assistance successfully to serve as a launching platform for tactical units, because the BSB has such a small military structure. See After Action Review, V Corps, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: Operations in Central Region (1996).

²⁰ (U) Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, commanding general, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, 1998-2002.

²¹ (U) The allusion is to Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, *Hope is Not A Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army* (New York, Random House, 1996).

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

will not really occur simultaneously. The 69th ADA Brigade's equipment, even as we speak, is moving to Bremerhaven and is going on a ship this week. It will be in Israel by the end of November, to pre-stage their equipment for an exercise in January called Juniper Cobra.²² But we are using that exercise as a cover to leave their equipment there so that when, and if, this goes down, all we have to do is move the people to Israel and not a whole bunch of equipment.

Q. That exercise has been on the books for more than a year.

A. The exercise has been planned for a long time. The idea here, of course, is to get the equipment in place so that it doesn't compete with other stuff for strategic lift when things get exciting.

The Corps Tac CP is already in Kuwait, and it will stay in Kuwait, so that we have a Corps command post available that we can use by just moving people and some limited equipment, like some of our one-of-a-kind signal stuff, and we can stand up a Corps command and control facility relatively quickly.

Q. Was deploying the Tac CP your decision?

A. I'll tell you how it happened. We got the request for forces. There was a draft request for forces for an attack helicopter battalion to go to Kuwait. When we got that mission, I said, first of all, we aren't going to send an attack helicopter battalion; we are going to send a task force with an organic command and control and medevac. In case they end up doing independent deep operations not under our control, they can then put the whole package together and do their own, internal personnel recovery. So we created

²² (U) The Juniper Cobra exercise, part of a series of joint US-Israeli air defense exercises, is an outcome of the 1999 V Corps deployment of Patriot missiles to Israel during Operation SHINING PRESENCE in December, 1999. See b 6 "Ruck it up!" *The Post-Cold War Transformation of V Corps, 1990-2001* (Hq., V Corps History Office draft MS, 2002), chapter 11.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

a task force, instead of just a battalion as had originally been requested, and ran that back through CFLCC and CENTCOM, and they agreed it was a good idea.

And then, when we requested a ship to send the task force to Kuwait, we asked for a ship that was a little bit bigger than what we really needed. I thought it was probably a good idea to have a command post over there, pre-positioned. In fact, (b)(3), (b)(6)²³ went over—God love him—and found a warehouse for us to put our equipment in, where it is safe and secure. All we have to do is get a couple of aircraft, a very few strategic aircraft, to move our people, and we can quickly have operating a command and control headquarters—albeit just a tac, and not very tactically mobile—but we would have a capability quickly in country that would be available to the CFLCC commander if he wanted to use it.

Then came the evolution of these two exercises, Internal Look in December and Lucky Warrior in November. Both of these exercises were relatively late-breaking news, generated in the last ninety days. We said that we already had a headquarters that was going to be in Kuwait anyway, and both Gen. Franks²⁴ and the CFLCC commander²⁵ agreed that was what they wanted us to do. In a very matter of fact way, the USAREUR DCSOPS²⁶ sent a short email to Gen. Meigs on the deployment of 2-6 Cavalry to tell him the squadron was on the way, the deployment was ready to go, the ship was on the way, and, of course, the Corps tac CP was at Bremerhaven ready to be loaded. Gen. Meigs sent me an email saying he didn't authorize that. I replied that, "roger, you didn't," and told him that I intended to sneak it into the country because that was the right thing to do.

²³ (U) (b)(3), (b)(6) V Corps ACofS, G-3.

²⁴ (U) General Tommy R. Franks, commanding U.S. Central Command.

²⁵ (U) Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, Commanding General, Third U.S. Army (U.S. Army Forces Central Command -USARCENT) and Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) , as of 4 September 2002.

²⁶ (U) Maj. Gen. Gary D. Speer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, as of 9 October 2002.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

He told me that we could not deploy the command post without CENTCOM asking for it. I'm not sure of the rationale. I think the rationale was, first, that he did not want to create a perception that these Army guys were going to be screwed up again in another deployment—that goes back to Task Force 1.4a—and because they knew that they were all screwed up, they had to infiltrate a command post into Kuwait. I think that was part of it. The second part is that it was a fact that I was taking a Corps command post out of USEUCOM's²⁷ area of responsibility and putting it into CENTCOM's area of responsibility for a specific task and purpose. So, as soon as I got Gen. Meigs' email, I got on the phone with the CFLCC deputy commanding general for operations²⁸ and said "we are ready to go, but you have to ask for us." And at that moment, our stuff was sitting at the port, ready to be loaded on the ship when we got this halt order. Within twenty-four hours—they worked the RFF²⁹ that quickly—we moved our command post to Kuwait.

So what was your original question? Whose good idea was it to send the CP to Kuwait? I guess it was our good idea, endorsed by everybody on the CENTCOM side who thought it was a good idea, but there were some political concerns that had to be worked out.

Q. I'm assuming, through all of this, that the Corps has not been relieved of any USEUCOM missions.

A. No. We have not.

Q. That makes it hard.

²⁷ (U) United States European Command, with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, is the unified command in Europe.

²⁸ (U) Maj. Gen. William G. Webster, Jr., Deputy Commanding General for Operations, Third U.S. Army (U.S. Army Forces Central Command – USARCENT) and Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).

²⁹ (U) Request for forces.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

A. That makes it *very* hard.³⁰ When we first got the mission in November, I recognized very quickly that we had four competing missions. There was the 1003 mission for Kuwait, the 4305 mission for Israel, the Balkans, and there was the Central Region force protection mission. Those four were competing, and since that time, we have added one, if not two. All this, we do with four maneuver brigades.

It was obvious to me about a year and a half ago—a little less than that—that, as we drew down in the Balkans, it made no sense whatsoever to have two divisions tied up in the Balkans, which was the situation I inherited. We had 1st Infantry Division committed to KFOR³¹ and 1st Armored Division dedicated to SFOR.³² That was basically stupid. I mean, KFOR used four thousand soldiers, while SFOR used about two thousand. Why the hell couldn't we screw up one division for a long time, as opposed to screwing up two divisions for a long time? I immediately began to work to figure out how to do that. As it has turned out thus far, 1st Infantry Division has been the unit that has gotten the long end of the short shaft. They have become the clean-up hitters for USAREUR. They have taken care of the Balkans and freed up 1st Armored Division to get ready for the 1003 plan. Their availability has also made them the candidate for the rear area mission in Turkey on the Northern Axis Option, as we are calling it.

Q. One of the conclusions we drew when the Corps finished its last SFOR rotation was that we could not attain T1 for every mission. As you think about the preparation for this mission, how do you balance retaining readiness for peace enforcement missions with readiness for heavy combat operations?

³⁰ (U) Emphasis in original.

³¹ (U) Kosovo Force. The U.S. commitment to the NATO peace enforcement force in the province of Kosovo, operating as Task Force 1.4a under operation JOINT GUARDIAN since 1999.

³² (U) Stabilization Force. The U.S. commitment to the NATO peace enforcement force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operating as Task Force 1.4a the designation having changed from Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1996 to SFOR.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

A. The trade-off is still there, but my judgment is that if we keep organizations and missions straight, there is no conflict. Since we were able to shed the SFOR mission and give 1st Armored Division a specific focus, they have focused on high intensity conflict and I believe they are in very good condition to fight that kind of battle. If we were to suddenly turn them around and send them to the Balkans, it probably wouldn't be very pretty, but they could do it. I've been reminded that when we first went into Kosovo, the guy who went in was not the one who had just completed the MRE,³³ but the one that was most immediately available, and that worked out. The other thing that I would suggest in this particular case is that the intensity of the threat in the Balkans has gone down sufficiently that we can accept some risk this year that, two or three years ago, we could not have accepted. And to the extent that we can continue to drive those forces down in the Balkans . . . I am not suggesting that KFOR and SFOR will ever be one command, but I am suggesting that the forces both for KFOR and SFOR can probably come from one source. I honestly believe that the conditions in KFOR are about the same as they were in SFOR two years ago when National Guard unit entered the rotation.³⁴ So, it's probably time, and I think the Army is considering this, to start thinking about putting National Guard formations in both KFOR and SFOR, in order to free up the active component forces to be used elsewhere. That would allow us to maintain our high intensity focus and relinquish our low intensity focus and the peace operations that have been resident here in Europe for a while.

Q. When I looked at the troop list for the operations plan, I was struck by the size of the Corps. I think it must be larger than any U.S. Army Corps since World War II. It's huge. Is our staff big enough to run such a combat organization and, if not, how do we fix that?

A. No. The staff is not big enough. We are going to have to get individual augmentation. The staff is not big enough, in my judgment, to do true 24-hour operations

³³ (U) Mission Rehearsal Exercise.

³⁴ (U) The 49th Armored Division (Texas Army National Guard), was the first National Guard unit assigned to the Balkans, commanding SFOR V from 7 March 2000 through 5 October 2000.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

and to provide the numerous liaison teams we are going to have to scatter all over the battlefield. As a minimum, those are two needs that we must fulfill.

Q. Liaison teams were certainly a big deal for Third Army in the last Persian Gulf War.

A. Of course, the CONUS Augmentations of the 3rd Corps Support Command and 19th Corps Materiel Management Center will be coming. The list of units for the Corps adds up to a pretty awesome force. The Army has done a pretty good job of putting together the right formations for the tasks. But it has been hard, working across multiple Corps and multiple major commands.³⁵ Our planners, by the way, have done superb work; remarkable work. Everybody wants to be involved, but everybody can't be involved, and everybody wants to help and therefore wants to know exactly what's going on before they release their units to us.

Q. That raises a question about the difference between operating as a USEUCOM unit and as a CENTCOM unit.

A. It's incredibly different. USEUCOM is a political headquarters. CENTCOM is a warfighting headquarters. That's about as simple as I can put it. There is a dramatic difference. When the Central Command commander goes to war, he is in command of the formation and he forms land, sea, and air component commanders who are his subordinates. In USEUCOM, my sensing is that the prevailing attitude is that they are a headquarters that gives missions and resources to somebody else and distances themselves from the operation.

The speed with which CFLCC turned around the request for our tac CP is an example of what I'm talking about. There is a dramatic difference, and it is cultural, too. It's not the fault of any personality currently in any position—there's the cultural aspect. The

³⁵ (~~S/ORCON~~) To cite only a few examples, the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), is under peacetime command of XVIII Airborne Corps; the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and 1st Cavalry Division are under peacetime command of III Corps.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

USEUCOM headquarters has always been kind of large and ponderous, hard to get things out of, very politically motivated, and very politically savvy. Then there was that ~~thing~~ *thing* called USAREUR, that has always had a culture of jumping through your ass all the time because that's what they did best.

I was thinking about it not too long ago. This is my third tour in USAREUR in three different decades, and each of those three tours was marked by a different phase of our Army—the Cold War, the draw down, and now whatever this one is going to end up being called. But in all three cases, there was a work ethic and an attitude in Europe that was unlike anywhere else I have ever been in the Army. There's a mission to be done, so let's go do the mission. There's a mission to be done, and we haven't done this before, but we can figure it out, so let's go figure it out. There's a mission to be done, so let's go do whatever needs to get done to accomplish that mission. That's the culture over here in USAREUR that is different than the culture in Fort Hood, Texas, or anywhere else in the Army. I think it has to do with being forward deployed. I don't think USAREUR has ever really lost the work ethic and the culture associated with the Cold War. I think we have just shifted that culture and that attitude to different missions, but we have never really lost the attitude and the culture that there might be something happening tomorrow morning. There is still a real urgency about what happens over here.

You asked the question about USEUCOM and CENTCOM. I guess you get the same sense of urgency at CENTCOM headquarters that you get in the United States Army, Europe. Maybe that's what makes the difference between them. Or maybe it's because CENTCOM has been able to focus on a single problem, while USEUCOM has to focus on 93 simultaneously, with all these countries in its area of responsibility. And, the fact of the matter is that NATO is a political institution that drives you to political types of conjuring work in the headquarters.

You'll recall that we changed our Warfighter from a Caspian Sea scenario to an Iraq scenario. In effect, the plan we fought during the Warfighter was the plan that we handed

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

off to the Marines. But it was still valuable because we came out of it a little bit better trained with respect to the area of operations. I am told, though nobody has confirmed it, that when V Corps said it wanted to change its Warfighter to Iraq, people in the States said "holy shit! They're really serious about this stuff." That was about four months after we drew up the plan, and I imagine that the news of our change in BCTP focus was a revelation to some of the units that were on the troop list in the plan—made them think that things really could be happening. The same thing is happening now at the 4th Infantry Division, which has changed its Warfighter to exercise the Northern Axis Option.

Depending on who you talk to, there is a range of possible outcomes that goes from the ridiculous to the sublime. On the one hand, there are folks who think that the mere presence of U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq will cause the whole regime to collapse. There are folks in Washington in places of authority, I am told, who believe that. There are others who suggest that the Iraqi Regular Army is not all that great, but they aren't just going to lay down their arms because of our mere presence. They are going to have to have something demonstrated to them—that they can get their ass kicked. And the Republican Guards will fight like they've always fought. Baghdad is going to be a hell of a fight. And there is a third group that thinks the whole fight is going to be really tough from start to finish.

Continuation of interview on 6 February 2003.

Q. General Wallace, when we scheduled this interview, you remarked that there had been considerable changes since the last time we talked. Would you please describe what you meant?

A. Oh, God . . . yes . . . a "bazillion" changes. I guess the fundamental change . . . I'm going to think out loud here . . . some of this stuff is what I'm thinking, not necessarily backed up by facts. I know you historians want to deal in facts, but I'm going to have to

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

start by telling you what I *think*.³⁶ I think, the last time I talked to you, I told you that there was this assumption . . . serendipity . . . about how easy this fight was going to be. I hope they're right, but all of my up-bringing suggests that, if you underestimate the other guy, you do so at your own risk. I believe that attitude has driven some decisions about how much of the force needs to flow, and how much of the force is actually needed for the operation. The politics of the entire deployment has been kind of interesting as well, and it is kind of interrelated.

Let's start with Turkey. Of course, we don't yet have authorization to go into Turkey, yet the 4th Infantry Division is loading into ships, even as we speak, to sail east. The intent is that, by loading them up and sailing them now, we can posture the force earlier than if we had waited for a Turkish decision, which is certainly true. Pieces of the 1st Infantry Division, by the way, are in the same boat. They are getting ready to sail east, but they don't know if they will have any authorization to enter Turkey either, although there has been a lot of work done as far as site surveys and so forth go. It's still a Turkish parliamentary decision.

In the south, in Kuwait, we have the 3rd Infantry Division pretty well set. We've got the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment³⁷ in place. We've got pieces of the Corps in place, but certainly not everything we need to cross the LD.³⁸ The intention is that, if the 4th Infantry Division is denied access to Turkey, then they'll take a hard right and go through the Suez Canal to the south, winding up in Kuwait. Now, we, the V Corps, have not practiced, exercised, or even discussed operations with the 4th Infantry Division, because the assumption all along has been that it would be going north. But that's OK. We can plug them in wherever we can plug them in. In fact, as you may recall, the 4th Infantry

³⁶ (U) Emphasis in original.

³⁷ (U) Referred to in V Corps as the 11th Aviation Regiment, on the basis of a USAREUR order so designating the unit, the organization remains an aviation group by MTOE and is so recognized by Department of the Army.

³⁸ (U) Line of Departure.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

Division, under the original plan, which is now not worth the ammunition it would take to blow it up, was the absolute last unit that was to be flowing into Kuwait. So the decision to send them to the north was an easy one, because it made more sense to take the last unit in the flow for the mission in Turkey, rather than overturning the entire TPFDD.³⁹ But it gets more complicated, as well.

The original plan, was a sequential attack, as you'll recall. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force was going to lead the attack with the 3rd Infantry Division under their operational control. At about C+40 to C+60, depending on the situation and the availability of forces, the V Corps was going to assume the main effort, receive attachment of the 3rd Infantry Division, and, while that initial phase was on-going, we would be flowing forces, getting the Corps set, and then take off to do the decisive operation. The plan now calls for two corps to attack abreast. The 1st MEF is one corps-sized element and the V Corps is the other. The 3rd Infantry Division will come under direct control of V Corps effective the fifteenth of this month. The MEF, in the meanwhile, is flowing, I think, every combat formation in the Marine Corps, save one regimental combat team. The MAW is already there. They anticipate 60,000 Marines on the ground by the end of this month. So, because of that, and because of our posture now, the Marines will have the right flank and V Corps will still have the left flank. There will be two three-star commands simultaneously attacking abreast, as opposed to the original sequential operation.

What is still not clear is what forces will be under V Corps command, and this is the 6th of February . . . we could be crossing the LD about thirty days from now. The reason why it is uncertain is that we don't know whether the 4th Infantry Division is going to Turkey or going south. The sequence of formations that was in the original plan no longer holds: 3rd Infantry Division; 11th Aviation Regiment; a brigade combat team, reinforced, of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); followed by the 1st Armored

³⁹ (U) Time Phased Force Deployment Data.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

Division, the rest of the 101st Airborne Division, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and then the 1st Cavalry Division. It has all been turned around, changed.

The changes in forces have been driven by the desire to have greater flexibility, earlier in the campaign, with the expectation that this will provide us the opportunity for an early regime collapse in Iraq. And thus we won't have to flow the other formations into theater. So instead of doing troop-to-task, we're doing task-to-troops. As I understand it right now—and all we are doing in V Corps is trying to influence decisions that are frequently made before anybody asks us what our opinion is—but as best I understand it right now, the Corps will be comprised certainly of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment. It appears that the force package that includes the rest of the Corps troops will at least go to the Secretary of Defense for his approval today. The force package that includes the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) will go to the SecDef either today or tomorrow for his approval. And beyond that, any other forces assigned to V Corps are unknown. I believe the CFLCC commander, and I talked to him yesterday, is putting together the force package that includes the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and its supporting elements, and that force package will go to the SecDef sometime in the near future for them either to start moving or to be placed on a prepare to deploy order.

So the formations available to the Corps, the sequence in which they arrive, and therefore the course of action which we employ for their application has all changed within the last week, certainly, and over the last couple of weeks, generally. You look as confused as I about this whole process.

Q. It leads me to a couple of questions. The decision to fight two corps abreast was made at Department of Defense?

A. No. That was a CFLCC decision—made by Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, the CFLCC and ARCENT commander.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

Q. The logistical support arrangements that had been articulated for the original plan have, I presume, been similarly affected? I refer particularly to all of those corps support groups that were to fall under command of 3rd Corps Support Command.

A. Right. The CSGs are generally aligned with divisions. What we have done in building these force packages—and I'll get back to that in a minute—is that each force package is actually two piles of stuff. One is the division organic, or the combat formation organic. The second is the echelon above that formation of stuff that needs to come with that division for it to be sustained over an extended period. What we used to call the "slice." That's how the package is being managed and developed, provided that you have this Corps base set at the very beginning, which is part of the first force package that we think is going to be approved. And, in fact, about fifty percent of that first force package is already moving, because it is part of other requests for forces. Now, how can we do this? The fact of the matter is that there is no TPFDD for this fight. Although we had one, once upon a time, that has now gone into the toilet. That is because we want to be able incrementally apply only as much force as is really needed for the operation . . . I *think*⁴⁰ . . . without having more than what we need. At least that's what it appears from the good old V Corps commander's perspective.

Q. Then it would seem difficult to have much of an operations plan at this late date if you can't be certain of the forces that will be assigned.

A. Well, we have an OPLAN to a point. But the tasks that were given to V Corps under the original mission and commander's guidance, from the CFLCC commander . . . in my judgment we can no longer accomplish all of the tasks that we were given. Unless there is a catastrophic collapse of the Iraqi regime. If there is a catastrophic collapse of the Iraqi regime, *theoretically at least*, you need less forces.⁴¹ I'm not sure that theory is

⁴⁰ (U) Emphasis in original.

⁴¹ (U) Emphasis in original.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

true, because you could be into like a KFOR 1A situation almost immediately upon initiation of hostilities if, in fact, all of those who think this catastrophic collapse is going to happen are right. I suspect, although I don't know for sure . . . from a point of conjecture . . . I suspect there are those in the Department of Defense who are trying to be very efficient, and as a result we may not be as effective as we might otherwise be. And we might get somebody hurt in the process.

I also think that the nuclear thing with Korea has caused us to pause a minute, also.⁴² The 1st Cavalry Division, for example, which was supposed to be part of OPLAN 1003V (South), and is still theoretically a part of that plan, is being talked about as an "insurance force." "Insurance" for what, I don't know, but my sensing is that they probably won't get to the fight in Iraq because we need to have some force to flow into Korea, should that situation get out of control. The fact that the 4th Infantry Division, which used to be last in the force flow but is now first, was also at Fort Hood familiar with the III Corps plans for Korea, makes the 1st Cavalry Division a force that those at the strategic thinking level probably don't want to move out of Fort Hood. Because of the contingencies that might arise.

Q. "Just in time logistics" applied to operations.

A. It's "just in time formations," here. So . . . now . . . in my judgment, we probably have the formations and the forces to do the first operation against the division that's arrayed in the center of the An Nasariyah area. Based upon our intelligence assessments right now, we don't see much enemy of any consequence between An Nasariyah up to the area around the Karbala and Al Hillah area, which is a distance of about 250 to three hundred kilometers. There is a big gap in there where we don't see any Iraqi formations at all. In my judgment, the enemy set hasn't changed substantially since last we talked:

⁴² (U) Simultaneously with the development of the crisis in Iraq, the government of North Korea announced resumption of its nuclear program, in defiance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to which it had previously agreed, and engaged in rhetoric that appeared to threaten hostilities directed against the United States.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

the Medina Division south of Baghdad; the Hammurabi Division north and west of Baghdad; and the Al Nida Division on the eastern approaches to Baghdad. But they are all in a relatively compact area—about 150 kilometers by two hundred kilometers . . . interior lines, and all that.

The problem is, in my judgment . . . there is this “golden rectangle,” as I call it, which is defined by four towns: An Najaf, Ad Diwaniyah, Karbala and Al Hillah. Within that area, just south of Baghdad, there are about two and one-half million people. My problem is that, once we are committed to crossing a line that takes us into those population areas, we are also committed to going all the way to Baghdad. I don't feel that the formations under my command will be able to stop, slow down, halt, or do anything other than get the hell of those populated areas as quickly as we can, because there is nothing good that happen in there. Right beyond those populated areas is the Medina Division, and right beyond the Medina Division is Baghdad. So you'd better have your shit together before you cross that line, because when you cross that line, you're buying into the urban sprawl issue to the south of Baghdad and the destruction of the Medina Division and continuing the fight all the way to the outskirts of Baghdad. If you slow down, or halt, and don't carry the fight all the way to Baghdad, you do so at your own risk, because you are now into the red zone fight. You are in the area where the Iraqi SSM brigades⁴³ can target you; he can use urban warfare, should he elect to do so; he can slow down your momentum and do all kinds of bad things to you, and he can also reposition forces if you don't do something clever to get them involved in the fight. You still have two Republican Guard divisions⁴⁴ that are around the Baghdad area. So you are committed once you get to that particular point.

⁴³ (U) Surface to surface missile.

⁴⁴ (U) The I Republican Guard Corps consists of the Adnan Division, the Hammurabi Division (Armored), and the Nebuchadnezzar Division. The II Republican Guard Corps consists of the Al Nida Division (Armored), the Medina Division (Armored), and the Baghdad Division.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

It appears that the units available to V Corps will be only the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 11th Aviation Regiment—all of them great formation, all of them good soldiers, all of them with great commanders, and all of them very capable of doing what they need to do—but with very little . . . nah, no . . . flexibility within the formation. Particularly if the weather goes to shit, because then I don't have the 11th Regiment or the 101st Airborne either one available to me, and I'm stuck with one division.

Q. Where is the 1st Armored Division in this mix?

A. The 1st Armored Division is toward the end of the flow and is being called another "insurance force," similar to the 1st Cavalry Division. After the 101st Airborne Division, the next force that I think will flow will be the 3rd Armored Cavalry, which is OK. That's good. My preference, stated to the CFLCC commander and to the CENTCOM commander, was to flow the 3rd ACR first and then the 101st, because I have a hard time crossing the LD with fifty percent of my combat power weather-dependent, which it is, right now. In fact, there is a Shamal blowing over there right now that is closing out all of southern Iraq, just closing it down for air operations.⁴⁵

So we are left with a plan which is very dependent on the enemy not being very good, or not being very tenacious, or both. It doesn't make much sense from the military perspective, but none of this makes much sense. The fact that we're managing the flow by requests for forces, which is an *extraordinarily*⁴⁶ painful process, rather than flowing the TPFDD, is also hard to deal with from a commander's perspective. It may make great sense politically, and I don't question that, but from a command perspective, it makes no sense, because I don't know what forces I can count on to support future operations. If there is a catastrophic regime collapse in Iraq, I don't know what forces

⁴⁵ (U) Strong winds in the region have been given local names because of their significance or seasonal occurrence. The most common is the *Shamal* (meaning "north wind"). The *Shamal* can blow over a 40-day period during the summer months (persisting for 1-5 days at a time), and occasionally during winter.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

will be available to control the countryside, similar to what we had to do in Kosovo and Bosnia.

Q. In terms of the size of forces needed, we have already figured out that anarchy is not better than order.

A. No. That's right. But I do know that we will probably need more forces than are thus far allocated to keep a lid on things long enough for some kind of stable government to be established. Now, if we'd had this conversation two and one-half to three weeks ago, the whole conversation would have been different. At that time, we were still flowing the TPFDD. Now, we're not, and the decisions are being made inside the Pentagon as to what we will flow, when we will flow, and somebody between my level and there is going through these requests for forces with a very fine toothed comb . . . trying to keep the size of the formation down.

If this works, it'll be brilliant. Now, the other thing that you probably ought to be aware of is that the formations that are flowing are very thin in some of the enablers. Neither of the divisions will have a reinforcing artillery brigade, for example. I will have a general support artillery capability at Corps level with the 41st Field Artillery Brigade, which will have, probably, two battalions under its command. But neither division will have a reinforcing brigade, because we're trying to make this force small and efficient. And, frankly, there is a great expectation that the Air Force will provide us the operational fires that we need, so that we won't need the artillery. Now, I thought we learned that lesson in Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan about a year ago, but apparently not. The Army didn't need to learn that lesson, but people that did, didn't.

The air defense piece of this is a lot more austere than I'd like it to be, and particularly the Patriot coverage. Because Patriot battalions are large and ponderous and hard to move, and take a lot of ships to move, and therefore we aren't moving as many Patriot

⁴⁶ (U) Emphasis in original.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

batteries as there are defended assets to protect. And this fight is, I think, a little bit about weapons of mass destruction, so that makes me a little antsy. Of course, we just go the message this morning that the 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade is not coming home after Juniper Cobra.⁴⁷ They're staying in Israel to do the theater air and missile defense and form the core of the Joint Task Force 1.4a in Israel.

Q. Did you anticipate that?

A. Yeah. I knew their equipment would stay after the exercise, and redeployment of the soldiers was about a fifty-fifty shot, just depending on the timing of things. So this was not unanticipated. All we have to flow now to set that 1.4b is a military police company and we're set, from the V Corps perspective.

In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait right now there is only one Patriot battalion,⁴⁸ though the Kuwaitis have several batteries of Patriots that do provide some coverage in Kuwait, specifically. Two of our batteries from the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, are being prepared to deploy into Turkey, also. By the time this thing is over with, every Patriot battery in the United States Army will have been accounted for.

Q. I was thinking too about the 101st Airborne Division and logistical support. Do you have any concerns about that issue, particularly the big task of keeping JP-8 supplied to the division's aircraft?

A. Yes and no. They are pretty healthy, as far as CH-47 capabilities go, so that they can haul a lot of their own stuff. Of course, that's weather dependent. They are short one of

⁴⁷ (U) Exercise Juniper Cobra, a combined US-Israeli air defense exercise, had been long planned and was an outgrowth of previous V Corps Patriot deployments to that nation.

⁴⁸ (U) The 3rd Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery, of the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, deployed to Saudi Arabia on 15 September 2002 for a six-month rotation of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the long-standing protective deployment to the peninsula. The battalion's tour of duty was projected to end in mid-March 2003, but was indefinitely extended.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

their Chinook companies, by the way. It's in Afghanistan. We're trying to figure out a way to get another company, but frankly, there are no companies left in the active component that aren't already committed, and I think there's only one battalion CH-47 battalion in the reserve component, and that of questionable readiness. At least, that's what I understand. So that is a concern, yes.

Of course, we have extraordinarily long lines of communications. Our MSRs⁴⁹ are dog shit. They are going to be hard to maintain. They are going to be clogged with vehicle traffic, I expect.

Q. It occurred to me to wonder about the relative mobility between V Corps and the I MEF, if the two corps have to fight side by side.

A. You know, I can't comment. I just don't know. I don't think the mobility issue is going to be a problem. It's incredible that they have been able to get there as quickly as they have. Of course, when you own your own navy and your own air force, it's not quite as hard as it is for the Army, which has to ask the other services for help when deploying. They have only two tank battalions in the regular Marine Corps, as you know, and they are both going to be a part of the MEF. They are moving essentially both Marine divisions, minus, I think, one regimental combat team that stays in Okinawa, or some place. Virtually the entire Marine Air Wing is in support of the I MEF, augmented by the II MEF. They have just about the whole Marine Corps committed to this thing.

My concern is not whether the Marines can move fast, but whether they can support themselves over the distances that we are talking about. At least in my puny little understanding of the Marine Corps, they are not designed for long legs and operational reach and campaigns that last anything other than about thirty days. Of course, this may

⁴⁹ (U) Main Supply Routes.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

be just the campaign that they're designed for, if this whole thing falls apart quickly and they can get their LAAVs⁵⁰ on roads and start moving out. Could be.

Q. How do you see the sequence of exercises at various levels, that the Corps has just gone through, having prepared the Corps for forthcoming operations?

A. We are talking about three recent exercises. There was Lucky Warrior in Kuwait, followed by Internal Look in Kuwait, followed by the Corps exercise we just finished, Victory Scrimmage.

Lucky Warrior was not of great benefit to the Corps from a warfighting perspective, but it forced the deployed headquarters, which was our forward command post, to think its way through some operational and strategic issues that were being forced upon us by the CFLCC, within the context of the CFLCC scenario. We could have done absolutely nothing and still met the CFLCC's training objectives. But we didn't. We did a lot of planning, a lot of rehearsing, a lot of thinking . . . and we probably gave CLFCC plenty to deal with to improve their own capabilities as a headquarters. The exercise itself revolved around the CFLCC's Battle Update Assessment, which is the equivalent of our Battle Update Briefing. I assume it was a pretty good workout for their staff, for their headquarters. But our command post certainly wasn't stressed at all.

Internal Look was about the same. It was more of the same. It was a CENTCOM exercise, and in fact, V Corps wasn't even on the list of headquarters in the training audience. What Internal Look did allow us to do . . . they played three different vignettes at three different points in time over three different possible situations . . . was look at three different sets of contingencies that could happen, and try to work our way through all that. The bulk of the exercises were OK. We are better as a headquarters for having participated in those exercises. But neither of them was anything even close to stressing the Corps like Victory Scrimmage did.

⁵⁰ (U) Light Amphibious Armored Vehicles.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

We just finished Victory Scrimmage, and it was a very good exercise. It was not a BCTP-Warfighter, by any stretch of the imagination. In hindsight, I'm not sure that it wasn't *better* than a BCTP-Warfighter.⁵¹ We had the 1st Armored Division, the 3rd Infantry Division, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, all here, playing in this exercise, as very heavy response cells. The commanders of each of those outfits was here. They brought their G3s. Depending on where they were in the deployment process, or whether they were deployed, some of them brought their whole staffs. All of them played 24 hours a day for two to three day vignettes, separated by about 48 hours of rehearsing and getting ready for the next vignette. It was a pretty good exercise. Unlike a BCTP-Warfighter, in Victory Scrimmage we fought the real bad guys, rather than some notional bunch of bad guys. We fought what we believed to be their actual set and their actual capabilities. We fought two different vignettes, neither of which was an exact approximation of the current war plan, because we planned the exercise in November and December, and by the time we executed it in January, the war plans had changed, as we have already discussed. As a result of that, we were kind of obligated to get everybody in the fight, since everybody came . . . and we did that. We exercised, for the most part, the two main formations that it looks like we're going to cross the LD with. The 3rd Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division were full players for both of the vignettes.

Q. As you consider the headquarters itself and the units you expect to command, what do you assess as the particular strengths or shortfalls of concern at this juncture?

A. Let me start with the subordinate headquarters. First of all, all of them have very good commanders, very good staffs . . . very focused, as you might expect. All of them have been thinking for a while about fighting this fight, so they are all pretty focused. All are really pretty well trained for the task at hand.

⁵¹ (U) Emphasis in the original.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

The 3rd Infantry Division had been in Kuwait forever, it seems like.⁵² They stance in the theater is great. They have been doing a lot of training at the brigade, battalion, and company level. Their command posts have been set in the desert for a while, so they have their procedures down pretty well. The 3rd Infantry Division, however, has not been used to operating under the command and control of a corps. During normal times, they don't routinely deal with a corps headquarters, because the division is sitting down at Fort Stewart and their corps headquarters is at Fort Bragg. There is a fair amount of independence there that, when you get into this kind of a fight, operating under a corps, you might not be used to having. So there might be some friction there. That's my only concern with 3ID . . . their familiarity with higher headquarters and operating under that control.

The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment has a good commander⁵³ and a good staff, but very, very young. Their regimental XO, for example, is a major, though they are authorized a lieutenant colonel. My sensing is that they are pretty well trained, but they are playing a lot of catch-up, particularly in the deployment business. As you recall, they were going to deploy very late in the flow, and only recently, they have been pushed up to the front. So they are playing some catch-up with regard to getting ready to go. From the training perspective—gunnery and individual skills and all that stuff—they are pretty straight, based upon what I am told by the commander and observations from others who have looked at the regiment. As you'll recall, throughout this whole thing, III Corps has not had a commander for the last three months or so. General Bell⁵⁴ came over here and his replacement was named but not immediately confirmed, so General Tom Metz⁵⁵ only today, I think, taking over III Corps. So there has been a void in the leadership of III Corps that the divisions are probably enjoying, but there also has not been the kind of

⁵² (U) Deployed when . . . commander . . .

⁵³ (U) b 3, b 6

⁵⁴ (U) General B. B. Bell, previously in command of III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, was promoted to four-star rank and assumed command of United States Army, Europe, on 3 December 2002.

⁵⁵ (U) Lt. Gen Thomas F. Metz.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

direction in the corps that the 3rd ACR might have needed. In any case, 3rd ACR is part of III Corps but stationed at Fort Carson, so they are always detached in the first place. Secondly, they are not part of, and do not come under the direct command and control of the division at Fort Carson. There is that separation. I guess my sensing is that the 3rd ACR could use some help in getting ready for this fight, at least from the deployment perspective. You have a colonel in command who is now playing alongside one- and two- and three-star commanders. The regiment's location doesn't lend itself to good oversight of its preparations, or to making the unit familiar with those larger, more senior formations it will now fight alongside.

The 101st Airborne Division is a solid organization with a relatively new commander, but his subordinates—all of his brigade commanders and his staff—are really solid. He is a very, very aggressive young man.⁵⁶ My challenge with the 101st will probably be making sure that they don't get impatient and do something out of . . . don't "hooah" themselves into something they can't get out of. I am very sensitive to putting soldiers on the ground that I can't link up with in a relatively short period of time, with a heavy formation, in case they get into trouble. Of course, if the 101st gets into trouble and the weather's shitty, then they're in *big* trouble.⁵⁷ That's something I'm very sensitive to, but I'm very pleased with what I've seen as far as their level of training, level of innovation, level of aggressiveness, and all of that sort of thing go.

The 1st Armored Division is rock solid. Very well trained. Rick Sanchez, the commander, is a very methodical guy. Their training program to this point has been very solid, and their deployment readiness is very good. The 1st Armored Division is very competent. Of course, I am more familiar with them than with the other units, just in the nature of things.

⁵⁶ (U) Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus, who assumed command on 24 July 2002.

⁵⁷ (U) Emphasis in original.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

Q. Do you expect deployment readiness to be better in a V Corps unit, because of what those units have been doing for the last five or six years, than in CONUS-based units?

A. Based on the emphasis we've put on it over the last couple of years, my expectation is that it would be better in Europe. But it's not automatic. You've got to put your finger on the pulse of deployment capability every once and a while and test it. It's easy not to do that stuff, because it's hard, laborious, and it's not very sexy. I'd tell you, though, that thus far, the deployment has gone really, really well. Our deployment specialists, the civilians we hired, and a couple of young lieutenant colonels on the USAREUR Crisis Action Team, for the deployments . . . and the units have responded really well. Now, I know that, down at the port, there is *something* that is screwed up.⁵⁸ That's just the nature of things. But I have not perceived any bottlenecks or choke points or anything like that. We've gotten all the data right. It's been very fulfilling to me, personally, to see all this happening, with apparent ease.

To return to your question about my impressions . . . , I haven't talked about the 1st Cavalry Division. The 1st Cavalry Division is a very solid unit. Joe Peterson⁵⁹ is the commander. The division is very focused on readiness and has been for a while. As a matter of fact, early in the campaign was given the mission that he was going to the big river crossing up at the . . . He focused on that with just a laser focus. In fact, on this exercise we have just completed, he went through the river crossing and did an extraordinary job. The concern now for the 1st Cavalry Division—you can feel it, though it's not on everybody's tongue—is "we've worked our asses off and we want to be part of the fight, and it doesn't look like we're going to be there." So there are some undercurrents of frustration in the organization, although it doesn't appear in their appearance or in the professionalism of the soldiers. And who knows? They might wind up being part of the fight after all.

⁵⁸ (U) Emphasis in original.

⁵⁹ (U) Maj. Gen. Joe Peterson.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

From the Corps perspective, the main command post is absolutely solid. I saw that during this exercise. I am a little concerned about the tactical command post, because many of the people who man the tac have been down in Kuwait, keeping our command post in Kuwait "warm" while we were doing the exercise, so they haven't had the experience that the guys in the Main CP have gotten. The rear CP is like most rear CPS. It's a conglomeration of stuff and people, and it's coming along. We just recently managed to get the 19th CMMC (CONUS Augmentation) mobilized, and have already gotten the 3rd COSCOM (CONUS Augmentation) mobilized, and those are the two outfits that we need to bring the 3rd COSCOM from C-3 to C-1 for personnel. We brought the 3rd COSCOM (CONUS Augmentation) here for an active training period and mobilized them while they were here. They are here and they are starting to flow down to Kuwait, as we speak. The commander of the 3rd COSCOM CONUS Augmentation is a brigadier general by the name of Don Jacka,⁶⁰ who is going to become the provisional Corps rear detachment commander, as soon as I depart. We'll give him the responsibility for family readiness and family support, and general court martial convening authority, and command of rear detachments. That's going to be OK, I think. The Rear CP is going to be OK. They did some really good work last week, although they were not explicitly a part of the exercise—they weren't playing as part of the simulation, because they had a team that was just coming together, so they took the opportunity to do a lot of teaching, coaching, rehearsing, and that sort of thing, of the rear CP.

I am also forming another command element within the Corps that I call the assault CP. It's based on three C2Vs,⁶¹ which was the armored command post vehicle that the Army decided not to buy several years ago. But, we have a bunch of them in mothballs, and we pulled some of them out to use. That's going to be where I spend most of my time, I think.

⁶⁰ (U) Brig. Gen. Don Jacka, USAR, Commanding 3rd Corps Support Command (CONUS Augmentation).

⁶¹ (U) Command and Control Vehicle.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

Q. That brings me to the question of how you intend to set the command posts.

A. First of all, understand that the structure of V Corps command posts is a matter of circumstance, not necessarily the way I wanted to do it. If you recall, I sent the tac CP to the desert in Kuwait, back in October of last year, so that we would have a command post to participate in the two exercises, Internal Look and Lucky Warrior. We augmented that with enough stuff to have a FECC⁶² capability and an ACE⁶³ capability in country, even though the main CP was back here with the people that manned those facilities. The original idea, back when we were planning on the sequential fight and the Corps was going to assume the main effort about 45 days after the war began, was to go to the CFLCC commander, which I did, and say "Hey, I've got this command post that can assume the responsibility, exclusively, for deep operations." That's all that I would have been able to do at the beginning of operations, because I would not then have had the forces in theater to do anything else. But it gives the CFLCC commander the opportunity to use me to open up a second front, just doing attack aviation operations, not unlike a Victory Strike⁶⁴ type exercise. That was my thought . . . to give the CFLCC commander another option, another set of alternatives to maintain a tempo of operations, which he might not otherwise be able to do. That forward CP, now, because of the change in the plan and the change in flow of forces, becomes essentially the Corps Main CP. Now, it's not set up exactly like the Corps Main, but it can function as the Corps main as long as we get the FECC and the ACE in there in sufficient time. And those guys are moving out next week.

That leaves me, however, with no ability to echelon my command posts. Hence the construction of the assault CP that I just mentioned, the C2V-based CP, which becomes a

⁶² (U) Fire Effects Coordination Cell, which handles the functions of the Deep Operations Coordination Cell.

⁶³ (U) Analysis and Control Element of the ACoS, G-2.

⁶⁴ After the redeployment of forces from Albania in 1999, V Corps annually conducted the Victory Strike exercise series at training areas in Poland. Normally scheduled in September-October, the live-fire exercise

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

surrogate tac CP for the Corps until the Main CP flows into country. I intend to go forward with the assault CP, right behind the 3rd Infantry Division. What I anticipate we will do is this: the Main CP, as it flows into the country, will stay packed up on its trucks and means of conveyance, so the first "jump" of a real, live, no-fooling Corps CP will be Main CP jumping forward somewhere south of An Nasariyah to set. When that happens, we'll have a real, live tac, main, and assault CP that can echelon like command posts in the Army were designed to do.

Q. Where do you intend to place the Rear CP?

A. The rear is probably going to stay in Kuwait until we get up around Baghdad. Then, I would like to move it forward, but I don't know that we're going to have the time to do that. As you know, that takes time—two days to break it down and another two days to set it up again—so I don't know if we'll have time to move the rear. But we are going to have to move the rear CP in this fight, I think, because we will be 650 or seven hundred kilometers away from the center of gravity, which is Baghdad. It's going to become really important that we be able not only to flow supplies for the units that are fighting, but also whatever support is going to be needed for humanitarian assistance and the means to control the bottom half of the country while we're fighting in the top half.

Q. How will you distribute general officers among the command posts?

A. I will be at the assault CP. The G-3 will be at the tac CP with no general officer. The chief of staff will be running the main CP. The DCG and COSCOM commander will be at the rear CP. One of my chores, I think, when this is all over with, will be to redesign the Corps headquarters, because it really isn't set up to function well. It's not designed around being able to do any of the tasks with which we're charged.

tested and developed the deep operations coordination cell, attack aviation in deep strike operations, and rocket artillery fires in the suppression of enemy air defense mission.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

Q. The organization of tac, main, and rear seems still designed for the Cold War fight.

A. Yes, and it needs to be a lot more mobile, a lot more robust—not necessarily more resources, but the resources it's got need to be in different places.

Q. Terrain, sir . . .

A. Sucks.

Q. Before the LD, how much does the inability to use Saudi Arabian ground hurt the initial deployment of forces or diminish the possibilities for offensive maneuver?

A. Interesting question. Before we cross the LD, I don't think it matters a hell of a lot. Now, what *is* going to matter is that we have an awfully lot of forces crammed into a very small footprint in Kuwait.⁶⁵ It's going to get kind of crowded there, both from a force protection perspective and from a simple matter of assembly areas. It certainly would be nice to spread out a little bit. And of course, it certainly does offer a Saddam Hussein a lucrative target for his chemical or biological weapons. The only thing that mitigates against that is that he keeps claiming he doesn't have any of those weapons. If he continues to make that claim, then maybe we're OK. Then, maybe, he won't try a preemptive strike with those weapons, because as soon as he uses them, he loses all credibility, such as it is, with the international community.

The ability to use Saudi terrain is linked to the port facilities that we would have available to us in Saudi Arabia. So, not having Saudi terrain doesn't bother me if we don't have Saudi ports to support it. Now, if we did have the ports in Saudi Arabia to support operations from there, I'm not sure that we have the port opening modules that would be necessary to operate them anyway. However, the MSRs for our logistics support that would come out of Saudi offer a road network that is a hell of a lot better than what we have right now in Kuwait. That could very well be significant before the end of the

⁶⁵ (U) Emphasis in original.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

campaign. The other thing that Saudi Arabia would have afforded us is a kind of protected flank, or an access to the Iraqi flank, a lot earlier than we are going to have such access with operations starting from Kuwait. Flowing out of Kuwait, there is only one direction to go, and that's north. If the Saudis were to open up some of their frontier to us, we could perhaps strike from two directions simultaneously. Again, that's contingent upon having the ports and MSRs to support the formations we would deploy in that way.

The MSRs from Kuwait into southern Iraq are really bad. They are very restricted and there's not much off-road mobility when you get into the Tigris-Euphrates valley. There is what looks to be a pretty good MSR south of the Euphrates, but it's only one road. There is not much interconnection between that road and others, because it is going through desert and along side a pipeline. MSRs and movement control, or movement management, are going to be a big deal.

Q. It would seem that security for such a long MSR would eat up a lot of forces.

A. Yes, it would seem so. And it will, eventually. Based on the intelligence we have, though, there is a whole lot of nothing in a lot of those places.. The MSR south of the Euphrates has no enemy forces on it at all until you get up around Baghdad, which is a pretty long stretch. That's not to suggest that they can't put something there . . . reposition some forces there . . . be kind of annoying in terms of putting special mission units against those roads, or something like that. But as far as large combat formations go, there's not much to worry about as things stand now. It's a little bit different when you get into the Tigris-Euphrates valley, largely because of the Feyadeen and al-Quds formations. The light infantry Feyadeen⁶⁶ are a bunch of thugs, and the al-Quds⁶⁷ are the

⁶⁶ (S) The Fedayeen Saddam units, constituted as commando forces, supplement the Special Republican Guard. The organizations formed in October, 1994, for urban combat and protection of state facilities. They also served as an emergency force to put down internal disturbances. Trained in Republican Guard facilities, some of the Fedayeen also received special forces training. The units are a mix of light infantry units and mechanized units equipped with older tanks and armored vehicles. Intelligence assessments held that Saddam Hussein would likely use the Fedayeen both for security purposes and for defensive operations. The total force is estimated at four brigades in the aggregate, though the Fedayeen are not organized as brigade forces.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

armed local militia, any of whom could decide to have a patriotic day and try to take on a U.S. column. So that is more problematic.

I think what we are going to be driven to, however, is having secure convoy support centers along the MSRs, and then securing the convoys themselves without even worrying about securing the MSRs. We don't have the forces available to run up and down the MSRs. It's going to be kind of like Vietnam, where we had convoy escort that went from point to point, base camp to base camp. And you kind of hoped that, *en route*, you weren't going to run into something more than the convoy escort could handle.

Q. Finally, I'd like to ask, aside from the things you have already outlined, your major concerns right now.

A. Well, I've got a bunch of them. First of all, we have a course of action that we just developed on 3 February, based on a course of action decision briefing that I received, that was in turn based on the forces that were made available to us about 1 February. That's about when we found out about this. The enemy hasn't changed and the terrain hasn't changed, but the forces have changed, and now I have to think about the application of the available combat power against the same enemy and the same terrain. So we've had to do some significant adjustments to courses of action to accommodate the forces that have been made available to us. I'm not overly concerned about it, but here

⁶⁷ (S/NF) Training of the reserve paramilitary al-Quds Volunteer Force (al-Quds is Arabic for Jerusalem) began in March 2001. In February 2001, Saddam Hussein announced creation of a 21-division army of volunteers to "liberate Jerusalem," and named the reserve paramilitary force al-Quds (Arabic for Jerusalem). Army and Republican Guard soldiers have given al-Quds basic military training at approximately 85 locations across Iraq. The value of the al-Quds appears limited to serving as a reserve internal security force, though over 6.5 million Iraqis had reportedly volunteered to serve as early as March, 2001. Of those, about one million, aged 18 to about 40 or 50, were probably selected for paramilitary training, supplemented by retired military officers and NCOs encouraged to join the force. The government has also asked the prison population to volunteer for service in return for release from confinement. The al-Quds evidently have no heavy weapons or armor, with the possible exception of one garrison that has a howitzer battalion. Training does not appear to be standardized, and intelligence estimates view the al-Quds as "only a marginally capable force for conducting military-type operations." The al-Quds have the potential to serve as a partially-trained manpower reserve for the regular Iraqi army. The principal value of the al-Quds to the regime is its propaganda value.

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

I am concerned about the Iraqi person. Not his government; not his army; but the Iraqi people. I read something the other day to the effect that seventy percent of the population was under the age of 35. The last time I looked, we weren't real popular with young Arabs. So even if they hate Saddam Hussein, to assume that they are going to love Americans is absolutely wrong, in my judgment. I don't think they're going to be any crazier about us being an occupation army than they have been about Saddam Hussein being a dictator. There's going to be a great deal of friction, I suspect, and angst on the part of the population, once liberated from Saddam Hussein's regime, for the Americans to get out . . . maybe turn it over to some other international force. It would be really cool if it was to be an Islamic-based force.

I worry about the reaction of our government the first time something goes wrong. Because something is going to go wrong. We are going to get some of our soldiers hurt. There is going to be some collateral damage that we haven't planned on or anticipated, or even wanted to have happen. I mean, it's just going to happen. It's inevitable. We are going to be getting into an urban environment in a country that, as you get closer to Baghdad, has a pretty dense population. So, I worry about our government and national will holding up under all of that. I don't think we will have a problem with the President and SecDef and Congress supporting operations until we come to whatever conclusion we are going to come to. But I am concerned about our ability to influence the public view, based on the Army's perspective of how things are going.

I am concerned about the deployment business. I don't know of a war that we've ever fought where we were flowing forces and deploying forces at the same time, without having set the formations for the fight. I guess you could make an argument that we were flowing and fighting at the same time during World War II, but most of the time, when we fought, we had the formations set before we crossed the LD—and that's not the case here. I am concerned about, if I need forces, because we have not predicted what we need, based on the way things are going, the fact of the matter is that the forces we will need are an ocean away. We will need to ask for those forces thirty to 45 days before

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~

they are actually needed, but we aren't going to have any idea whether we will need them or not, 45 days in advance. That's the case with the 1st Armored Division right now. If I need them sixty days from now, they need to start moving now.

So . . . that's what keeps me awake at night. It's a pretty fascinating business.

Approved for Release

~~SECRET / ORCON~~
~~NOFORN~~